Since taking office, Xi Jinping has strictly controlled the activities of senior political figures (primarily former members of the Standing Committee), replacing their secretaries and drivers. Senior officials are prohibited from organizing or making casual "inspections" to local areas; everything requires approval from Xi Jinping's General Office. However, after the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee in the middle of last year, retired officials have become increasingly frustrated. In particular, veteran Party figures who supported Deng Xiaoping's semi-market reforms or had experience in leading economic policymaking, including Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, and Li Ruihuan, have rarely joined forces to speak out against Xi. Consequently, at the end of September, Xi brazenly replicated Wen Jiabao's 4 trillion yuan "flood" policy of late 2008, with Wen and Li Ruihuan sitting on either side of him at the National Day gala. Unfortunately, Xi's "moderately" loose monetary and fiscal policies, which emphasized central control over all sectors of the economy, have failed to achieve the desired results. The only result is that while a "national unified market" appears to have been established, exports and foreign investment have shrunk, consumption has failed to be boosted, and central and local governments have further accumulated debt. While the political elders may not be enough to dethrone Xi, his power and prestige are rapidly declining. The most obvious example is that Xi's two economic control platforms—the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission and the Central Commission for Deepening Overall Reform—have canceled their regular meetings, and ministerial officials are unwilling to endorse "high-quality reforms" and the extremely limited monetary easing policy.
