The Financial Times published an article by columnist Gideon Rachman stating that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most “unforeseeable problems” predicted in history. For decades, academics and military game theorists have speculated about the possibility that Iran, in wartime, might close this narrow waterway through which 20% of the world’s oil exports pass.
Donald Trump was warned of the danger posed to the Strait of Hormuz as the US and Israel prepared to attack Iran. But the US president ignored these concerns, predicting instead that the Islamic Republic would quickly capitulate.
The writer added that the conflict with Iran, which began with vague war aims, now has one clear and dominant goal: reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
Ironically, and infuriatingly, the only reason for the closure of the strait is the war waged by the United States and Israel in the first place.
Trump cannot reopen this vital waterway by declaring victory and withdrawing, as his war with Iran, specifically the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, will determine the course of the remainder of his presidency and may cast a shadow over his successors.
Rachman added that Trump cannot reopen this vital sea lane by declaring victory and withdrawing, as his war with Iran, specifically the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, will determine the course of the remainder of his presidency and may cast a shadow over his successors.
The reason is that closing the Strait of Hormuz causes an immediate crisis and a long-term strategic dilemma. The immediate problem is that the longer the closure lasts, the greater the risk of a global recession. The future dilemma is that Iran now understands that its control of the Strait of Hormuz allows it to strangle the global economy. Even if it loosens its grip in the short term, it can tighten it again in the future.
Rachman added that the difficulties of reopening the strait are quite clear; Iran doesn't need to sink or obstruct every tanker attempting to pass through. The wave of attacks already carried out, and the threat of further attacks, have been enough to convince ship owners, crews, and insurance companies to avoid using it.
Furthermore, a massive bombing campaign against Iranian military infrastructure , or even a potential US occupation of Kharg Island, crucial to Iranian oil exports, is not a direct solution to the Strait of Hormuz problem. The Islamic Republic possesses numerous military options for threatening shipping through the strait, including sea mines, missiles, limpet boats, and drones. Iran has extensive experience in drone warfare, with its Shahed drones playing a decisive role in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Trump is now urging America’s allies to send their naval forces to break the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and has even appealed to Beijing. While it is true that the UK, the EU, and China have a vested interest in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, it is understandable that they would be reluctant to risk their forces to solve a problem they did not create, and one that the US Navy cannot resolve alone.
But a year of tariffs, threats, and insults from the Trump administration toward its European allies has eroded goodwill toward Washington. They also understand that any naval force operating in the Strait of Hormuz would be vulnerable to Iranian attacks and could have to sustain the operation for many months. The United States might consider using ground troops to secure the coastlines near the strait. But deploying ground forces in Iran would inevitably lead to greater American casualties and would not even guarantee the limited objective of reopening the strait.
It is true that the UK, the EU, and China have a genuine interest in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, but it is understandable that they would be reluctant to risk their forces to solve a problem they did not create, and which the US Navy cannot solve on its own.
Rachman believes that behind the immediate crisis lies a long-standing problem. By assassinating Iran's leaders and asserting that regime change is a war objective, the United States and Israel have fundamentally altered Iran's motivations.
Before this latest war, the Iranian regime had an incentive to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the United States, which would be the inevitable consequence of closing the Strait of Hormuz. But Iran’s thinking has now changed. As Sir Simon Gass, the former British ambassador to Tehran, observes, Trump’s push to overthrow the Iranian government “is the moment the regime concludes that this is a fight for survival, and therefore it must use all available means, including closing the Strait of Hormuz.”
Iranian moderates, who previously advocated diplomacy with the Westover all-out confrontation, may have been severely damaged by the American attack launched during negotiations. Even if the Islamic Republic were to decide at some point that it was in its interest to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, it would always want to retain the option of closing it again as a clear deterrent to aggressors.
Therefore, the United States and Iran’s wealthy Gulf neighbors will face daily drone and missile attacks, posing a long-term dilemma. Will they seek a settlement with the current hardline Iranian regime, hoping to persuade it not to close the Strait again? Or will they push harder for regime change in Iran, accepting all the risks associated with a protracted military conflict and regional chaos?
The author argues that the Islamic Republic is currently facing a massive economic and military blow, but having demonstrated to the world—and to itself—that closing the Strait of Hormuz poses a real and viable threat, Iran has discovered a powerful deterrent for the future that does not rely on nuclear weapons. If the regime survives this war, it may emerge from it in a stronger international position.
