This obsession was not limited to rhetoric, but rather became a cornerstone in formulating the Israeli security doctrine, which was based on expanding the vital space, creating strategic depth, and seeking to impose military arrangements that weaken adversaries and restrict their capabilities.
The idea of “disarmament” was not presented before 1948 in its technical form known today to Zionist organizations, but the logic of monopolizing power and preventing the formation of any Arab military capability in the vicinity of Jewish communities inside Palestine formed the theoretical and practical basis for this approach.
After 1948, this vision crystallized into clear policies: buffer zones, disarmament or arms control arrangements, and truce agreements that appeared to be mutual but in practice tended to favor Israel.
The Syrian example clearly illustrates this. The General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria on July 20, 1949, stipulated the establishment of three demilitarized zones between the armistice line and the 1923 borders, with an area of approximately 66 square kilometers in the Hula Valley and on the shores of Lake Tiberias.
On paper, the disarmament was mutual. In reality, however, it served to remove the Syrian army from the new Israeli settlements, paving the way for their expansion. This expansion was facilitated by legal ambiguities surrounding land, agricultural and water projects, and Israeli military superiority. Thus, the demilitarized zones gradually transformed into disputed areas, and then into de facto realities on the ground that entrenched Israeli control and granted it de facto legitimacy.
The 1967 defeat and disarmament: From strategic depth to the engineering of geography
The 1967 defeat marked a turning point in the development of Israeli security doctrine. With the occupation of Sinai, the West Bank, Gaza, the Jordan Valley, and the Golan Heights, the discussion shifted from mere deterrence to a redefinition of borders and strategic depth. From that moment on, any potential Israeli withdrawal was contingent upon two constant conditions: either maintaining strategic security buffer zones or ensuring the demilitarization of the areas from which Israel withdrew.
This logic was clearly embodied in the Camp David Accords with Egypt, as well as in the 1974 disengagement arrangements in the Golan Heights.
Israeli writer David Govrin, quoting Meir Rosen, former legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry and one of the drafters of the Camp David Accords, recounts the extent of the debate that took place with the Egyptian delegation in 1978 regarding Israel's insistence on the demilitarization of Sinai, in exchange for what it considered a "concession of strategic depth." The withdrawal was conditional on a complete restructuring of the Egyptian military presence in the peninsula, not merely the return of the land.
Sinai and Rafah were divided into four zones: A, B, C, and D, with precise specifications regarding troop numbers and permitted weaponry. Zone C, extending from the Green Line in the west to the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba in the east, was restricted to UN forces and Egyptian police with light weapons, according to Article 4 of the treaty's annex. Even the 2021 amendment, which allowed an increase in Egyptian forces to 750 personnel with armored vehicles, remained subject to strict controls and limitations.
This experience reveals that Israeli suspicions towards the countries of the region do not seem to be dispelled except through direct occupation or actual disarmament.
Israel operates on the premise that it is surrounded by hostile
environments that could escalate at any moment, which, in its view, justifies altering the geographical realities on the ground, even if this infringes upon the sovereignty and rights of other states. Even countries with which it has signed peace treaties remain under suspicion, and this suspicion extends to the United Nations forces deployed along the front lines.
This approach rests on two central narratives: the narrow geographical depth that leaves Israeli infrastructure exposed, and the demographic gap with the surrounding Arab world. Through these two factors, security has become a tool for reshaping geography, and demilitarized zones have become a permanent mechanism for managing and consolidating superiority, not merely temporary arrangements for reducing tension.
The Oslo Accords were a commitment to disarmament.
The Oslo Accords enshrined the logic of disarmament as a central pillar in the architecture of the relationship between the occupation and the Palestinians. It stipulated a Palestinian entity without an army and without sovereign military capability, in exchange for an authority with limited powers that possessed a police force for internal security, while the Israeli army monopolized full military power.
The security annex specified the number of rifles and pistols that the police were allowed to carry, and prohibited the possession of tanks, missiles, or air defense systems. It also subjected the import of weapons to prior Israeli approval.
This was accompanied by the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, which maintained effective security control in the hands of the occupation. Moreover, the Palestinian police were tasked, under the same arrangements, with disarming other factions and preventing weapons from entering Palestinian society. Palestinian crossings were also subject to monitoring aimed primarily at controlling the flow of weapons. Thus, disarmament was not a procedural detail in Oslo, but rather the very essence of the agreement.
This pattern has been repeated in other security agreements and arrangements with neighboring countries, where Israel has focused on guarantees of disarmament or arms control without relinquishing its right to use military force to implement its agenda. The Lebanese example illustrates this: Security Council Resolution 1701 stipulated that the area south of the Litani River should be free of any weapons outside the control of the Lebanese state and UNIFIL forces. However, the reality on the ground has demonstrated repeated Israeli violations and its continued right to conduct military operations in those areas.
The inevitable conclusion is that demands for disarmament, whether in Gaza, southern Syria, or southern Lebanon, must be approached with the utmost political and legal caution. Experience shows that disarmament of the Arab side is met with Israel maintaining a superior and ever-increasing military force, along with a long history of violating agreements when circumstances change.
Therefore, disarmament cannot be accepted in isolation from a fair and balanced political solution, nor can it be linked to reconstruction or de-escalation files, as there are no guarantees that prevent the reproduction of displacement scenarios or a return to war.
