Former US diplomat and NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller confirmed that the global nuclear doctrine is experiencing a real crisis, represented by the decline in the effectiveness of traditional nuclear deterrence that has governed international relations since the end of World War II.
In an analytical article titled “The Strange Defeat of Nuclear Deterrence and the Coming Crisis in Strategic Stability” in Foreign Affairs magazine, the researcher stressed that recent wars and conflicts have shown that possessing nuclear weapons is no longer sufficient to prevent adversaries from carrying out painful military attacks. Rather, states and armed groups have become more willing to test the limits of nuclear power and target the interests of states that possess this weapon without serious fear of a nuclear response.
Ukrainian marches and Russia's nuclear program
The author, who served as Deputy Secretary General of NATO from October 2016 to October 2019 under Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and before that as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. State Department, cited as an example of her argument a “ daring Ukrainian operation ” carried out inside Russian territory in 2025, when Kyiv was able to use small, low-cost drones to strike Russian air bases housing strategic bombers linked to Russian nuclear capabilities.
Moscow had previously threatened a nuclear response to any targeting of its strategic assets. However, it did not resort to the nuclear option against Ukraine and limited itself to a conventional military response, demonstrating the limits of its nuclear threat.
She pointed out that the operation constituted a military and political shock, not only because of the losses suffered by Russia, but also because Moscow had previously threatened a nuclear response to any targeting of its strategic assets. However, it did not resort to the nuclear option and limited itself to a conventional military response, demonstrating the limitations of the nuclear threat when it comes to real and ongoing conflicts.
The author argues that this example reflects a broader shift in the international strategic environment, as it was widely believed in past decades that possessing nuclear weapons provided countries with an almost absolute security umbrella, and that the fear of nuclear retaliation would deter adversaries from daring to attack.
However, recent developments have shown that this hypothesis is no longer as valid as it once was. Ukraine continues to attack sensitive Russian targets, and Iran and its allies attack Israel despite its strategic deterrent capabilities. India and Pakistan have also engaged in direct military confrontations despite possessing nuclear weapons.
According to the author, the proliferation of low-cost drones and precision missiles has profoundly changed the nature of warfare. It has become possible to inflict significant damage on powerful nations and strategic facilities using relatively simple means in terms of cost and technology, thus narrowing the traditional gap between major powers and their adversaries, and allowing smaller actors to pose unprecedented security challenges to nuclear states.
At the same time, the writer drew attention to the “nuclear taboo,” as nuclear weapons have not been used in wars since the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, leading to a widespread global conviction that resorting to them represents a serious transgression of political, moral, and humanitarian boundaries.
As a result, political leaders have come to realize that the use of nuclear weapons would have enormous international and historical consequences, making the nuclear threat less credible in many cases.
Israel's nuclear program and attacks by Iran and its allies
The writer pointed out that Israel provides a clear example of this shift, because despite its long-standing reliance on a policy of nuclear ambiguity, it has not been able to prevent the attacks it has suffered from Iran and its allies, nor has it resorted to nuclear threats, but rather to air and missile defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, David's Sling, and the Arrow system.
This reflects a practical shift from the concept of “deterrence by threat” to the concept of “deterrence by prevention,” that is, preventing the adversary from achieving its goals by strengthening defenses and preventive capabilities.
Israel provides a clear example of this shift, because despite its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity, it has been unable to prevent attacks from Iran and its allies, nor has it resorted to nuclear threats.
Hence, the author calls for a reconsideration of the military priorities of nuclear states, and believes that, instead of spending hundreds of billions on modernizing nuclear arsenals and increasing the number of platforms carrying nuclear warheads, more resources should be directed towards protecting bases and vital facilities and developing air and missile defense systems capable of confronting new threats, especially swarms of drones and precision missiles.
Despite this skepticism about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, the author does not go so far as to say that nuclear weapons have lost their value entirely, because they still play an important role in preventing direct confrontation between major powers, especially between the United States and Russia.
The writer explained that the fact that both sides possess thousands of nuclear warheads makes any direct clash between them fraught with the risk of mutual destruction, which drives them to a great deal of caution. However, this same balance may become more fragile with the rapid expansion of Chinese nuclear capabilities, and the resulting changes in the global balance of deterrence.
The decline in the status of the American nuclear umbrella
On the other hand, the article explained that the decline in confidence in the American nuclear umbrella may push some allied countries, especially in Europe and East Asia, to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons, especially since there are voices in Poland, Germany, South Korea, and even Japan have begun to raise this option more clearly.
However, the author believes that more countries possessing nuclear weapons will not achieve the desired security, but will increase the likelihood of nuclear accidents, miscalculations, the spread of fissile materials, and their access to non-governmental entities or extremist organizations.
More countries possessing nuclear weapons will not achieve the desired security; rather, it will increase the likelihood of nuclear accidents, the spread of fissile materials, and their access to extremist organizations.
In light of these transformations, the author calls for the development of a new system of international rules and norms aimed at reducing the risks of nuclear escalation. These efforts include preventing the targeting of civilian and military nuclear facilities during wars, and expanding existing agreements between some countries to become general international rules.
The author concluded that the world is entering a new strategic phase in which the absolute status of nuclear weapons as a guarantor of security and stability is declining, because the rapid development of conventional warfare technologies, the increasing effectiveness of drones and precision missiles, and the rising political and moral costs of nuclear deterrence have become factors that push towards redefining the concept of national security.
The author concluded by saying that countries wishing to protect themselves in the coming decades should build flexible and advanced defenses and enhance their ability to withstand conventional attacks, rather than relying on the assumption that possessing nuclear weapons alone is sufficient to deter adversaries and prevent them from taking risks.
