The Financial Times published a report prepared by its correspondent Najmeh Bozorgmehr from the Iranian city of Mashhad, in which she analyzed the situation in Iran after the burial of its former leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
She said that Khamenei spoke in 2024 about the “ideal life,” describing it as one in which a person receives an education, becomes “useful to Islam,” lives into their eighties or nineties, and then dies a martyr. A year or so later, the 86-year-old Khamenei met this fate, killed last February at the start of the American-Israeli war on Iran—an end his supporters described as the culmination of his revolutionary narrative.
Khamenei will be buried on Thursday in the holy city of Mashhad, his birthplace, in a ceremony that will be more than just the conclusion of his days-long funeral.
Little is known about Mojtaba's plans, and given his lack of his father's revolutionary record and decades of power, analysts and officials expect a system in which institutions like the Revolutionary Guard play a larger role.
Bozorgmehr argues that this symbolic end will also mark the end of an era spanning nearly 37 years, during which Khamenei was the central figure who shaped the Islamic Republic and maintained its unity. He reshaped institutions, from Shiite religious groups to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, supported armed groups across the region, and suppressed waves of popular dissent at home, making him in his later years an increasing target of public anger against the regime.
His son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, will now take the reins in a country exhausted by war and burdened by economic crisis.
However, little is known about Mojtaba's plans, as he has not been seen in public since his appointment as Supreme Leader in March. Lacking his father's revolutionary record and decades of power, analysts and officials anticipate a system in which institutions like the Revolutionary Guard play a larger role, even if Mojtaba remains the ultimate decision-maker.
She questioned whether this model was sufficient for the regime's survival. One insider believes the regime has reached a point where even Khamenei is no longer capable of resolving the country's problems, as internal and external challenges have become too complex. The source adds, "Now, his son is in a better position to turn over a new leaf, backed by powerful institutions."
She said that the Revolutionary Guard, under its new commander Ahmad Vahidi, wields considerable influence over security, foreign policy, and large sectors of the economy, and that its power has grown during the war. Mojtaba is also expected to rely on religious organizations that mobilize supporters during crises, wealthy patronage networks, and regional proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite the weakness of these groups as well.
Saeed Laylaz, an Iranian analyst, was quoted as saying: “The networks built under Ali Khamenei helped the country survive the war, and now, Mojtaba Khamenei will have the final say on all major decisions, but institutions will play a bigger role than before.”
Even before the conflict erupted, the regime was in crisis. Mass protests broke out in January, the culmination of years of sanctions, international isolation, and economic stagnation. These protests ended in a brutal crackdown that left thousands dead. The violence further eroded the already diminishing legitimacy of the Islamic Republic in the months leading up to Khamenei's death.
However, the Islamic Republic sought to transform the six-day funeral procession, during which Khamenei's coffin was transported through Iran to Iraq, into a show of defiance, presenting the massive public turnout as proof that it had not only survived the war but also retained a loyal popular base. The ceremonies also served as an opportunity for the regime's new leadership to make a public appearance after months of seclusion.
Vahidi, whose predecessor as commander of the Revolutionary Guard was killed during the conflict, was seen publicly for the first time since the war last week next to Khamenei's coffin.
Also appearing were Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who emerged as one of Iran’s most powerful wartime leaders, along with President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and others.
Even former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had a falling out with the regime and whose neighborhood was bombed in an incident that killed several of his bodyguards, emerged after months of speculation about his fate.
However, Mojtaba Khamenei has not appeared anywhere, nor has he released any audio or video messages since taking power.
Even before becoming Supreme Leader, his public appearances were rare. Politicians and officials within the regime, as well as some foreign diplomats, insist that his four-month absence is due to security reasons and that he remains in control. They say he has recovered from injuries sustained in the airstrikes that killed his father, his wife, his sister and her husband, and his 14-month-old niece, all of whom will be buried in Mashhad. Nevertheless, Mojtaba's absence has sparked speculation about his whereabouts among some Iranians accustomed to the regular speeches of his father, Khamenei, whose public communication was a cornerstone of his rule.
Mojtaba’s first major decision reveals a cautious approach. Last month, he authorized Pezeshkian to sign a memorandum of understanding to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s new source of leverage, and to begin negotiations with the United States on an agreement to end the war, while distancing himself from the deal. Although Mojtaba stated in a written statement that he opposed the agreement “in principle,” the Supreme Leader said he allowed it to proceed because it had been approved by the Supreme National Security Council, which includes Iran’s top military commanders and is chaired by the president.
His statement also clarified that the responsibility for realizing the economic benefits of the agreement, including ensuring the release of frozen Iranian assets, rested with Pezeshkian. This incident suggested that Mojtaba was attempting to continue his father's long-standing policy of balancing competing factions within the regime. On the one hand, he was granting space to pragmatists like Qalibaf, who saw the agreement with the United States as the only way to secure sanctions relief and alleviate economic pressure.
Many in the large crowds attending the funeral held up signs calling for revenge and chanted “Death to America,” directing their anger at the officials leading the talks.
A source familiar with the regime's affairs said, "Qalibaf is now the new leader's right-hand man. He understands that his top priority is the country's development, and he will prove to be pragmatic." However, this approach faces fierce resistance from within the regime's base, which sees negotiations with Washington as a stark contradiction to its ideology and Khamenei's legacy.
Many in the large crowds attending the funeral held up signs calling for revenge and chanted “Death to America,” directing their anger at the officials leading the talks. “It’s inconceivable that the negotiators would trample on the blood of our leader and negotiate with the United States,” said Mahnaz, a 35-year-old primary school teacher who attended the funeral procession in Tehran.
However, this over-reliance on hardline principles risks alienating broad segments of Iranian society, including the urban middle class and a growing secular youth population, who are demanding an end to the regime's religious restrictions and greater openness to the world. Some within the regime believe that making too many concessions could embolden many Iranians who despise the government and evoke memories of the protests that rocked the country in January.
Hamid Reza Taraghi, a hardline politician in Mashhad, was quoted as saying: “In the new chapter, the Supreme Leader will show less tolerance towards anti-regime forces at home. The institutions, led by the Revolutionary Guard, will help the new leader exert greater control over state affairs. Younger generations will enter the system who are willing to take risks.”
A senior reformist official expressed his belief that Iran “will become more politically closed, while becoming more open to social issues. It is difficult to imagine a radical change in the Islamic Republic.”
Mojtaba signaled continuity by reappointing hardline judiciary chief Mohseni Ejei for another five-year term. However, many observers believe the crucial test will be Tehran's ability to reach a lasting agreement with Washington in the coming months, which would require Iran to make significant concessions regarding its nuclear program.
This would give the new Supreme Leader an opportunity to begin embracing his father's legacy. However, achieving such an agreement faces enormous obstacles.
Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesar, a reformist politician in Mashhad, says that while he believes Mojtaba may make some changes to domestic policy, the regime will become more assertive internationally. He added, “Some policies, especially those related to the region and the Persian Gulf, may become more hardline, and Iran is no longer afraid of war.”
