Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had good reasons to stop answering questions from Israeli journalists after US President Donald Trump announced a temporary ceasefire with Iran and instead delivered a recorded speech to the Israeli public, in which he spoke at length about the "achievements" of his army.
Netanyahu and Trump realize that they have failed to translate their tactical military achievements—namely, eliminating Iranian regime leaders and damaging Iranian military capabilities, civilian infrastructure, and energy facilities—into strategic gains that would bring Tel Aviv and Washington closer to achieving their stated war goals.
For Israel, the war represented a shift from the "violent containment" strategy it
this sentiment lightly when, at the end of the first day of the war, he boasted that he had "changed the face of the Middle East."
But what actually happened was the exact opposite; the Iranian regime not only survived, but became more cohesive, determined, and defiant, its internal and international legitimacy was strengthened, and its self-confidence grew to the point that its delegation in the Islamabad negotiations demanded that the United States release Iranian assets as a condition for conducting the negotiations, not as a result of them.
Even if a new regional order emerges after the war, its direction will not serve Israeli interests. The United States' inability to protect the Gulf states from Iranian attacks could push most of these countries to seek strategic partnerships with other powers, such as Turkey and Pakistan, thereby reducing their dependence on the American security umbrella.
This reality will clearly reduce the chances of expanding normalization agreements, since most of the Arab and Islamic countries that reached agreements did so in the hope of improving their relations and strengthening their partnerships with the United States, based on the slogan "The road to Washington passes through Tel Aviv."
But the biggest manifestation of Tel Aviv and Washington’s failure in the war was that it unprecedentedly strengthened Iran’s regional and international standing after closing the Strait of Hormuz, enabling it to control the nerve center of the global economy, which led to a rise in energy prices, particularly in the United States, and fueled criticism of the decision to wage war in the American arena.
Furthermore, control of the Strait of Hormuz has enabled Iran to generate substantial revenue by imposing fees on ships passing through it. In Israel, at least, some believe that the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to Iran is now comparable to that of its nuclear program.
The United States and Israel also failed to achieve two key war aims: eliminating Iran’s nuclear program and missile arsenal. Iran still possesses 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, enough, theoretically, to produce eight nuclear bombs. Meanwhile, the latest US estimates indicate that the intensive Israeli and American attacks succeeded in destroying less than 50% of Iran’s missile arsenal. On the eve of the Islamabad negotiations, the Iranians consistently made it clear that their missile arsenal and their right to uranium enrichment were non-negotiable.
These negotiations are likely to address the fate of enriched uranium and the enrichment levels Iran will adopt in its nuclear facilities in the future, without diminishing its right to enrichment. It's worth noting that Netanyahu has been demanding that Iran not only be prevented from enriching uranium but has also insisted on the dismantling of its nuclear facilities. Many assessments in Israel confirm that what strengthens Tehran's bargaining position in the Islamabad negotiations is the fact that the level of domestic American criticism of the course and outcome of the war will make Trump reluctant to resume it, regardless of Tehran's intentions, despite his continued threats.
Furthermore, a clear divergence has emerged between the United States and Israel regarding the separation of the battlefields. Israeli Channel 13 reported that Trump threatened Netanyahu, saying he would initiate a ceasefire with Hezbollah to ensure Iran's continued adherence to the agreement without coordinating with Israel. The announcement of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel could be a prelude to ending the war against Hezbollah. If this were to happen, it would be considered a victory for Iran and a strategic failure for Netanyahu, who has consistently claimed to reject linking the confrontation with Iran to the war against Hezbollah.
The war is likely to inflict unprecedented strategic damage on the US-Israeli relationship in the medium and long term. Numerous reports, including a recent investigation by The New York Times, confirm that Trump decided to launch the war against the advice of his top aides, based on misleading and false information provided by Netanyahu. According to these reports, Netanyahu convinced Trump that eliminating Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, would lead to the rapid disintegration of the country and would strengthen the Iranian public's resolve to rise up against him. He also claimed that Iran could not close the Strait of Hormuz. However, the reality was quite the opposite.
This has led to a wave of sharp criticism of Israeli conduct among American elites, both those belonging to the Democratic Party and those belonging to Trump's base, known as MAGA, with Netanyahu being held responsible for harming American interests. This criticism has impacted American public opinion toward Israel.
According to a public opinion poll conducted in the United States shortly after the ceasefire was announced, 70% of Americans under the age of 50 hold a negative view of Israel; this includes 57% of Republicans and 84% of Democrats. This reality could pose significant risks for Israel, as the negative public sentiment could influence the outcome of the crucial midterm congressional elections scheduled for next November, potentially leading to the victory of candidates who oppose continued military support for Israel.
The war's outcome negatively impacted Netanyahu's image and domestic standing. A question echoed in Hebrew television studios and media outlets: Did Israelis spend 40 days in shelters only to have the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war, reopened? The war significantly eroded Netanyahu's credibility domestically; many commentators reminded him of his boast at the end of the war he launched in June 2015 that he had eliminated the Iranian nuclear program, only to return to another inconclusive war that further increased the risks to Israel.
The results of the war have impacted the popularity of Netanyahu's Likud party; polls conducted after the ceasefire announcement showed a decline in the party's representation.
Despite the foregoing, the future of the ceasefire hinges on Trump's resolve to restrain Israel. Netanyahu will undoubtedly seize every opportunity to resume hostilities, whether against Iran, Hezbollah, or both, particularly before the Israeli parliamentary elections expected in October. Netanyahu is fighting not only for his historical legacy but also for his personal future; an election defeat would pave the way for his trial on serious corruption charges, which could lead to his imprisonment.
