An Israeli researcher and head of a strategic affairs institute believes that dividing the Gaza Strip is reasonable and necessary because it perpetuates the division within the Palestinian national movement and absolves Israel of responsibility for the lives of Gazans. Professor Efraim Inbar, head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, which specializes in Middle Eastern affairs and national security issues, says that discussions about the future of the Gaza Strip have faded from the forefront of the media due to the American-Israeli war against Iran.
However, according to his claims, Trump’s ambitious plan to rebuild Gaza will not see the light of day, explaining that the international stabilization force that was supposed to enter Gaza to provide internal security has not yet been established, and that members of the technocratic government that was planned to run the sector during the transitional phase are hesitant to enter Gaza as long as Hamas is in power.
He adds in an article published on the institute’s website: “Furthermore, Nikolay Mladenov, the senior representative of the ‘Gaza Peace Council,’ informed the UN Security Council that the establishment of a civilian transitional authority in Gaza is not currently possible, and that diplomatic efforts to disarm Hamas, a prerequisite for progress, have so far failed to overcome the movement’s opposition.”
However, he says that Israel will have to return to discussing this issue after the war against Iran ends, at which point attention will shift again to other arenas.
He goes on to outline his vision: “Hezbollah is weak in Lebanon, but it is still well armed and retains an effective veto over the decisions of the Lebanese government. Similarly, Hamas has withstood pressure to disarm and remains the de facto ruler of the areas it controls, which exceed 30% of the Gaza Strip, while the Israeli army continues to gradually reduce its areas of influence.”
Anbar believes that it is not surprising that armed organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, cannot be eliminated as long as their ideology enjoys broad support within the societies in which they operate, especially as long as they receive military aid from abroad.
Renewed war on Gaza
The Israeli researcher explains that the occupation army presented plans to resume the attack on Hamas with the aim of disarming it and achieving the “complete victory” demanded by some politicians, but this goal is unrealistic, and it is likely that they will be satisfied with the current situation.
He points out that Israel has not succeeded in eliminating or dismantling Hamas in the West Bank, even though the area has been under its military control since 1967.
He also says that opinion polls consistently show that Hamas remains popular among Palestinians despite the enormous suffering caused by the October 7, 2023 attack.
According to the Israeli researcher with right-wing Zionist leanings, Hamas still possesses large quantities of weapons compared to what it had before the war, and it appears that it has rebuilt its arms smuggling networks. It is also recruiting and training new fighters to consolidate its rule and prepare for any future Israeli attack.
According to Anbar’s claim, there is no doubt that the Israeli army is capable of occupying the entire Gaza Strip, and the idea of a “decisive victory” may be tempting, but completing the mission remains doubtful for many reasons: Occupying the entire Strip would place its nearly two million residents, who are suffering from difficult economic conditions, under Israel’s direct responsibility.
However, the continuation of the current situation, in which the sector remains divided, relieves Israel of this burden, which has also become a challenge for the international community after the Security Council adopted Trump’s plan on Gaza.
He adds: “It is true that Israel is still considered responsible for the entry of humanitarian aid and the movement of people to and from the sector, but this is a much lesser responsibility than managing the sector in its entirety.”
fertile environment
In his view, a full occupation would also transform the Israeli army into an occupying force operating within a civilian society that Hamas had nurtured for years to be hostile to Israel, thus providing a fertile environment for guerrilla warfare against its forces.
He also says that attempts to win the hearts of the population, as sometimes happens in counterinsurgency wars, are not a realistic option in Gaza, and that any large-scale project to eliminate extremism needs many generations and its chances of success are very limited, so it is better to direct Israeli efforts elsewhere.
He believes that this multi-front war, which began on October 7, 2023, is the longest military campaign in Israel's history.
He notes that despite the resilience shown by Israeli society and the ability of the economy to endure, Israelis are looking forward to a period of calm.
This is justified by saying that the current military deployment in Gaza, which provides protection for the areas surrounding the Strip, requires a relatively limited number of soldiers, while resuming the war with the aim of occupying the Strip completely would require a large-scale mobilization of reserve forces, and would be costly in terms of human lives and finances.
divide and conquer
Anbar says that a divided Gaza, where Hamas remains in control of part of the Strip while Israel militarily administers other parts, also serves another strategic goal: maintaining the division within the Palestinian national movement, which is considered Israel’s main long-standing rival.
The policy of separating Gaza from the West Bank, which has been in place since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, has also contributed to weakening the Palestinian national movement and undermining demands for the establishment of a Palestinian state, an option that most Israelis oppose today.
Contrary to the view of Israeli observers, Anbar believes that it should be emphasized that the events of October 7 were not evidence of the failure of the separation policy itself, but rather the result of Israeli intelligence failures and a false assumption that Hamas was weak and deterred.
As for the “quiet for quiet” policy that Israel has followed for years, he believes it is the factor that has allowed Hamas to greatly enhance its military capabilities.
It is believed that in protracted conflicts against hostile states or armed organizations, the concept of “mowing the grass,” that is, carrying out periodic military operations aimed at reducing the enemy’s capabilities, temporarily rebuilding deterrence, and lengthening the intervals between rounds of fighting, is the most realistic approach.
Ephraim Inbar concludes that the existence of a Hamas-controlled enclave in Gaza is an acceptable outcome, provided that Israel continues to periodically weaken the movement's capabilities.
Abandoning the idea of occupying the entire sector would also spare Israel the burdens and political complexities of occupation, and might also alleviate international criticism, provided that it clarifies that it is not seeking to annex the territories it controls, and allows humanitarian aid to continue.
