“How Iran Changed the Concept of War? Lessons from Tehran’s Use of Precision Weapons” by researcher and former US Department of Defense official Michael C. Horowitz, in which he confirmed that the American-Israeli war on Iran revealed a profound shift in the nature of modern wars, the title of which is the emergence of what the expert calls “precision mass,” that is, the intensive use of relatively cheap weapons capable of hitting their targets with precision.
Horowitz, who previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the United States, stressed that America and Israel bombed thousands of targets in Iran, yet the Iranian regime remained in power after more than 6 months, and was able to retaliate by closing the Strait of Hormuz , which raised energy prices and gave it additional political leverage.
The US and Israel bombed thousands of targets in Iran, yet the Iranian regime remained in power after more than six months, and was able to retaliate by closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Horowitz, who holds the Richard Perry Chair and is the director of the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, attributes Tehran's resilience to its extensive preparations for a potential war, its ability to restructure its leadership, its securing of imports to prevent economic collapse, and, most importantly, its possession of a large arsenal of inexpensive and precise drones and missiles. He argues that these weapons have allowed Iran to inflict damage on American bases and regional infrastructure, and to impose a high cost on its defense.
The expert, a senior fellow specializing in defense technology and innovation at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes the new equation overturns traditional assumptions of military superiority; offense has become cheaper than defense. For example, Iran's Shahed-136 drone, costing around $35,000, can be countered by an American Patriot missile costing approximately $4 million. Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult for militaries to continue intercepting swarms of inexpensive weapons using costly systems.
Technological superiority is not enough… the end of the monopoly of power
The author, who also wrote "The Spread of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics" and co-authored "Why Leaders Wage Wars," points out that America remains superior in some areas, particularly artificial intelligence, information processing, and target identification. However, Horowitz warns of data errors and the dangers of over-reliance on algorithms. He argues that America's fundamental problem is no longer the speed of information processing, but rather the size of its weapons stockpiles.
The researcher emphasizes that technological superiority alone is insufficient if militaries are unable to transform their organizational structures. The United States relies heavily on expensive weapons and platforms such as Tomahawk missiles and F-35 fighter jets, while "precision mass" requires mass production of low-cost systems, different training, and greater speed of deployment.
Horowitz argues that Iran has demonstrated that weaker states are no longer excluded from the military power race. Its underground missile networks and dispersed facilities have made it difficult to completely destroy its capabilities, while Washington has been forced to consume large quantities of its expensive missiles, straining its stockpiles intended for deterring other adversaries, such as China.
The Iranian model and the cheap arms race
He adds that many countries have already begun to adopt the Iranian model. North Korea is developing inexpensive drones, Poland has increased its spending on drones and countermeasures, while European and Asian countries are working to expand their unmanned attack capabilities.
Conversely, the author warns of a growing gap between the cost of offense and defense. The United States consumed a significant portion of its Patriot and THAAD missiles during the war, while cheaper alternatives, such as directed-energy weapons and interceptor drones, are not yet ready for large-scale deployment.
He emphasizes that the proliferation of this technology will make the balance of power less dependent on wealth alone, because countries can produce large quantities of precision weapons at relatively low costs. He believes that Washington's success will depend on its speed of adaptation, not on possessing the best weapons.
Horowitz concludes that the era of “precision mass” has begun, and that Washington must invest in inexpensive offensive weapons and low-cost defenses, along with reorganizing its forces to utilize these capabilities. In his view, continued reliance on expensive and limited systems may not be be sufficient to maintain American military superiority in future wars.
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