An Israeli media report noted the escalating tension in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue, coinciding with the ongoing war in Sudan, which has brought Egyptian-Sudanese relations back into confrontation with Ethiopia.
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With the threat of a joint defense agreement between Cairo and Khartoum looming, concerns are rising that the accumulated crises could escalate into a regional conflict, although analysts in Tel Aviv rule out a direct war due to its exorbitant cost and far-reaching consequences.
According to the Israeli channel i24NEWS, this escalation followed an Egyptian-Sudanese ministerial meeting that affirmed the direct link between the two countries' security and their readiness to take measures guaranteed by international law and the joint defense agreement to protect their shared interests. In a simultaneous development, Ethiopia ordered six Sudanese diplomats to leave the country within 48 hours, a move reflecting the widening crisis between Khartoum and Addis Ababa.
The renewed invocation of the 1976 joint defense agreement between Egypt and Sudan has raised the possibility of military escalation, after Cairo emphasized that Sudan's security is an integral part of its own national security and that it will not allow its red lines related to Sudan's unity and territorial integrity to be crossed.
The Israeli channel i24NEWS reported that analysts in Tel Aviv believe that invoking the agreement does not necessarily represent an immediate readiness for war, but rather constitutes a tool of political and security pressure against Ethiopia, and a message that Cairo is prepared to expand its options if it feels that the water and security balances in the region are under direct threat. The
Israeli channel added that these messages gain added significance given the ongoing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt considers a strategic threat to its water security, while Ethiopia insists on its right to utilize water resources for development.
She pointed out that the absence of a binding agreement on the dam's operation and information exchange leaves the door open for renewed crises, especially given the entanglement of the water issue with political and military conflicts in the region. She emphasized that observers in Tel Aviv believe the Egyptian move cannot be separated from growing concerns about Ethiopian influence, particularly as Addis Ababa seeks to bolster its military capabilities and expand its regional presence, including the search for a permanent sea outlet.
The Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement coincided with escalating Sudanese accusations that Ethiopia is allowing its territory to be used for attacks by the Rapid Support Forces against Sudanese army positions and civilian facilities, including power stations and energy infrastructure. Khartoum filed a complaint with the Security Council and African Union institutions, accusing Addis Ababa of facilitating cross-border attacks—accusations that Ethiopian authorities either deny or have not independently confirmed.
Analysts believe the Sudanese war has become a major factor reshaping relations among Horn of Africa countries, as the confrontation is no longer confined to the army and the Rapid Support Forces but has extended to military and logistical support networks and regional borders. In this context, Sudanese figures accuse the UAE of providing support to the Rapid Support Forces through regional channels, including Ethiopia, Chad, and areas under the control of Khalifa Haftar's forces in Libya. Researchers indicate that these accusations, along with the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), provide Cairo and Khartoum with common ground to intensify pressure on Addis Ababa, even though the two sides' interests do not necessarily align on all issues.
Cairo views Sudan as a strategic depth to the south, not only because of the shared border but also because of its direct connection to the Nile River, the Red Sea, and regional security balances. From this perspective, strengthening relations with Khartoum provides Egypt with greater room to maneuver in its dealings with Ethiopia, whether regarding the GERD or regional security issues.
Israeli experts believe that Cairo may use the Sudanese crisis to bolster its negotiating position on the dam, while Khartoum seeks to leverage Egyptian support to pressure Ethiopia on the war-related accusations. This raises questions about whether the current rapprochement reflects a comprehensive strategic alliance or a temporary convergence of interests against a common adversary.
Despite the escalating political and military rhetoric, researchers rule out a swift turn for the current threats into a direct war between Egypt and Sudan on one side and Ethiopia on the other, given the immense military, economic, and political costs of such a confrontation.
Analysts warn that any military intervention could prompt Ethiopia to call upon its regional alliances, broadening the conflict to include other actors in a region already grappling with protracted crises, stretching from Sudan to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the ongoing Sudanese war makes Khartoum the most vulnerable party to the repercussions of any escalation, given the depletion of its military, damage to its infrastructure, and the worsening humanitarian crisis.
Between brandishing the joint defense agreement and exchanging accusations of supporting armed groups, Cairo and Khartoum face a double-edged sword: increasing pressure on Ethiopia without sliding into open confrontation, and maintaining joint coordination without allowing Sudan to become an arena for settling regional scores.
The Israeli channel concluded its report by stating that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis no longer appears to be a separate water issue, but rather part of a broader equation intertwined with the Sudanese war, regional influence, and competition over the Red Sea. This makes any new escalation between Cairo, Khartoum and Addis Ababa likely to redraw the balances in one of the most fragile regions.
