In the mouth of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin is his best friend. However, the evolution of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has so far evolved. If the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to deepen, what impact will it have on China? Some Chinese domestic strategists are also worried. Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Beijing, is a Chinese expert on strategic security issues and nuclear weapons policy. He accepted an exclusive interview with our reporter Zheng Chongsheng, analyzing the risks and tests that Xi Jinping and Putin may face in the strategic calculation of the two countries in a similar decision-making environment.
Russian Invasion of Ukraine
"President Putin is the leader of a major country with world influence and my best friend." Xi Jinping told Putin in person in 2018. He also awarded the first "Friendship Medal" of the People's Republic of China to this close friend, applauding Putin. . CCTV broadcast footage showed Putin's signature ice cube face melting from time to time on the podium in the golden hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, showing a smile.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, the first foreign head of state Putin spoke with was Xi Jinping. According to the announcement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the call on February 25 , Xi Jinping pointed out that it is necessary to abandon the Cold War mentality, attach importance to and respect the reasonable security concerns of all countries, and form a balanced, effective and sustainable European security mechanism through negotiations. China supports Russia and Ukraine to resolve the issue through negotiation. China's basic position on respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter is consistent.
Reporter: It is said that Putin and Xi Jinping have similar personalities, and the relationship between China and Russia is largely determined by the personal friendship of the two leaders. What is your observation?
Zhao Tong: Indeed, Russia's political decision-making mechanism is similar to China's, that is, there is a strong core leader whose authority is basically absolute and rarely questioned. Staff members also expressed strong support for them personally. It is difficult for them to get absolutely different voices, and I am afraid it is difficult to hear some completely different ideas.
In addition, the overall domestic public opinion atmosphere of China and Russia is also very similar, both of which are carefully managed by the media and state authorities.
China 's strategic misjudgment of Russia-Ukraine "low-intensity, small-scale" war
Reporter: The U.S. official has clearly pointed out that before Russia invaded Ukraine, the U.S. had informed China of relevant information. The international community is curious as to whether Putin met Xi Jinping in Beijing at the opening of the Winter Olympics, and did he personally say anything to Xi Jinping? To what extent has China misjudged its strategy before the Russian-Ukrainian war?
Zhao Tong: My personal inclination is to think that China may have concerns at the beginning, predicting that there may be a "low-intensity, small-scale" military operation. However, the mainstream judgment of China, including the government, is that Putin forms geopolitical influence by displaying the military pressure and momentum of the army on the border, so as to achieve his diplomatic and security goals. soldiers".
China may also have thought that if the West does not compromise and force Putin to have some practical applications, it will only be a small-scale, quick-fix war like a surgical operation. Therefore, I don't think China predicted that this would be a full-scale, invasive war, let alone a strong reaction from the international community, or even the very unsmooth progress of the Russian military in the future.
Differences in perceptions at home and abroad make the risk of misunderstanding quite high
Reporter: How will the Russian-Ukrainian war affect China's geostrategic environment? Has China's foreign policy circles made pre-judgments for the next decision?
Zhao Tong: I guess that the Chinese foreign and security policy community has no consensus at all, and is still in a heated debate. An important factor is that the outcome of the war is still unpredictable, and what kind of impact it will have on the geopolitics of the European region and even the world is even more vague.
Of course, some scholars believe that the longer the war is, the more Russia and the West will be consumed, and they will be caught up in European security issues, which will give China more strategic space in the Asia-Pacific region.
However, there are also concerns that this war has greatly affected China's international image, and that China is dragged down by Russia, which will even make Western countries more worried about China. Those of this school of thought imagine that, you see, a Russia with an economy not as large as China's Guangdong Province could have such a disastrous outcome, and China's economy is so large that its hostility to the West is at least as deep as Russia's. , the potential threat may be greater in the future. Experts in this school worry that the West may be more determined to contain China's rise.
I don't think China's current views are inconsistent. I don't think China will make significant adjustments in major strategic issues and foreign policy in the near future, because further judgments are needed on the final trend of the war.
Reporter: But are policy debates and voice channels like this open? You also mentioned that after the war started, the cognition of basic facts in China and the Western society is basically like two parallel universes. Is this one of the reasons for misinterpreting and misjudging the war?
Zhao Tong: The channels for Chinese citizens to obtain information are different from those in the West. The Chinese government carefully manages the access to information of the Chinese people, as do scholars. Being in such a society, in such a large environment, undoubtedly puts scholars under pressure as well. If there are too many reactions that are considered to be cognitive perspectives or suggestions that represent the Western way of thinking and looking at problems, his opinions are unlikely to be conveyed upwards, and his personal social pressure will increase.
In this system, everyone hopes that their suggestions can be recognized by the leaders, which fundamentally discourages scholars from making some inconsistent policy suggestions, and scholars also worry that they will be considered by upper-level officials or the public as biased towards the West, not if they do not. Speak for China. This kind of public opinion pressure will also reduce public speeches in this regard. I think it will still have a systemic impact. Of course, in the long run, there will be certain risks.
Reporter: What kind of risk?
Zhao Tong: For example, the cognitive difference between domestic and international is an issue that needs attention. Assuming that there is an international dispute, it is possible that the decision made by the Chinese leadership is unpredictable and understandable by the international community, but is supported by the domestic people, which will also form a confrontation between China and the West, and the risk of mutual misunderstanding is still quite high.
Do you have bad luck regardless of friend or foe? The Realism of Chinese Diplomacy
Reporter: The late former Chinese ambassador to France Wu Jianmin once pointed out that whenever China sees the world wrong, its domestic policy will also go wrong, and "we (China) will be in bad luck." The opinions that can be presented in China are one-sided support for Russia, even more support for Putin than the Russians, but they do not talk about the past Soviet aggression against China. For example, after the Zhenbao Island incident, it was the United States that helped prevent a Soviet nuclear attack on China. The strike plan, not to mention the occupation of Chinese territory from Russia to the Soviet Union exceeds several Diaoyutai. What do you think of this phenomenon?
Zhao Tong: Those historical facts exist objectively, but when the mainstream narratives in society are systematically managed, and the government obviously does not want everyone to examine this history too much, I think this kind of people are more worried or dissatisfied with Russia. Sound doesn't make much of an impact.
The mainstream consensus in Chinese society at this stage is that Western countries pose a strategic and all-round challenge to China's national rejuvenation and national rise. On this issue, there is no doubt that Russia is China's strategic partner, and Russia can provide China with strategic support , are like-minded brothers.
Moreover, China's mainstream cognition believes that "there are no permanent partners, only permanent interests", and the interests of China and Russia in this regard are highly consistent. "Abandoning past suspicions, not reversing past events, and concentrating on current strategic tasks." I think from this perspective, China has not had further reflection on the historical issue with Russia.
Russia becomes an international outcast
Reporter: The Russian-Ukrainian war has come to this point. What kind of lessons can it teach the Chinese decision-making circle?
Zhao Tong: The impact on China is that the outside world originally speculated whether China would take advantage of the West's control of Eastern Europe to take a surprise move against Taiwan. However, I think this possibility has decreased.
The Russian-Ukrainian war showed everyone that "war is never that simple". For China, it is more important to consider how to establish effective local management after the military unification of Taiwan? This will make China face more serious constraints in the military. When a quick solution is not possible, the international community will have the opportunity to intervene. Whether it is military aid or various economic sanctions, over time, will this cause economic and social problems within China? This is what the Chinese government is most concerned about. If political security is challenged, it is more serious than the challenge of not liberating Taiwan. I think various factors will make China re-calculate and rethink its strategy on the Taiwan issue. This possibility is relatively high.
Worried about Putin's surprise move
Reporter: You specialize in nuclear weapons policy and strategic security. According to the current situation, do you think Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the start of the third world war? How likely is it to turn into a nuclear war?
Zhao Tong: Personally, I don't think it's enough to use "World War III" to describe the nature and potential violence of this war. It is also confined to Eastern Europe, and Russia's current strategic intention is not to provoke a larger all-out war with Western countries.
The only risk is that Russia faces a huge setback in this war, be it conventional battlefields or economic systems or even domestic political stability. When Putin, as a strongman, is forced into a corner, will he escalate the war in an unexpected way, or even introduce nuclear factors? I think this risk cannot be completely ruled out, but at present the absolute value is not high.
Putin is still a rational man, but his cost-benefit calculations are inconsistent with others.
He upgraded nuclear weapons to the highest alert state. From his point of view, it was to deter military aid and economic sanctions from Western countries, not to take the initiative to use nuclear weapons first. Before the Russian army attacked the facilities around the nuclear power plant, it was mainly to occupy important basic measures. I don't think he intends to create a nuclear leakage crisis at a nuclear power plant to escalate into a nuclear war. He is still relatively rational.
But I do worry that as the war ends more and more unfavorable for Putin, he will make unexpected moves.
It is very difficult for China to act as a mediator
Reporter: Ukraine, the United States and the European Union have all called on China to exert influence. Could China possibly play the role of mediator?
Zhao Tong: I think the difficulty is still quite big. One is China's self-confidence, and the other is China's resources. In the long run, it seems uncertain whether China has sufficient resources and influence locally. What China has announced is to provide support within its capacity, such as some humanitarian aid, which is far from the idea of playing a mediator.
Reporter: But like the U.S. call for China to exert influence over Russia? With China and Russia so close, what role can Beijing play in Moscow?
Zhao Tong: China's views on Russia are complicated. For a long time, China has viewed Putin from the perspective of admiration and worship, calling him "Emperor Putin". He is regarded as a powerful geopolitical master with great strategic means and is worshipped by the Chinese people. In contrast, for a long time, China has appeared in the Sino-Russian bilateral strategic relationship as a younger brother. Although this relationship is rapidly changing, especially with this war, the relationship will soon undergo qualitative changes, but China doesn't seem to have this idea to influence Russia, especially a figure like Putin, in bilateral relations.
In my opinion, many places in China are learning from Putin, rather than having the confidence to think that they can influence Putin. Moreover, in the Russian-Ukrainian war, China actually did not understand what kind of strategic goals Putin wanted to achieve. How can China put pressure on Putin and play a mediating role when it cannot draw a conclusion? I think the reality is quite difficult.
Reporter: Thank you for accepting my interview.
Note: Zhao Tong is a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in strategic international security issues, including nuclear weapons policy, arms control, non-proliferation, and missile defense. He previously worked in the Foreign Affairs Office of the Beijing Municipal Government.
The content of the conversation between the reporter and Zhao Tong has been excerpted.
Sophie Richardson: "Michelle Bachelet is unlikely to conduct an unlimited investigation in the Uyghur region"
Reuters reported on March 8 that the Chinese government had recently agreed to the request of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michel Bachelet to visit China. A senior UN human rights official said Michelle Bachelet would also visit the Uyghur region during her visit to China. It is reported that Michelle Bachelet's visit to China is scheduled for May.
If the visit is to take place in May, Michelle Bachelet will be the first high-ranking UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit China in 17 years.
Following the announcement of Michel Bachelet's visit to the Uyghur region in May, international human rights organizations responded strongly.
Amnesty International said in a statement that Michel Bachelet's visit to China was an important step in the human rights abuses of Uyghurs and other Muslims living in the region, and that any visit by the High Commissioner to China would be "independent". He emphasized the need to focus on solving this great task: "One of the things you and other people can do is keep up the pressure ... there are going to be some difficult decisions for government".
A statement from Human Rights Watch said, "Earlier in the day, diplomats and journalists visited Xinjiang and the Chinese government carefully set up fake platforms. Chinese government officials have long been deliberately misrepresenting the human rights situation in Xinjiang. This state-of-the-art work, which has been hampered by state control, could play a role in whitewashing China's human rights abuses. "The UN visit to China may even promote the Chinese government's propaganda."
Kenneth Ross, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, said in a speech to Michelle Bachelet at the UN Human Rights Council: There is no time to be complacent now, as serious crimes that need to be addressed urgently are still going on. We urge you to complete your mission and release the report without further delay and to show the results of the meeting. "
Sophie Richardson, director of the Chinese branch of Human Rights Watch, was interviewed by our radio. When we asked him if Michelle Bachelet was likely to have an unlimited investigation in China, he simply said: "I do not believe that the Chinese government, which has consistently denied and tried to cover up its crimes against humanity, will allow Michel Bachelet to see anything but what he wants."
Michelle Bachelet told the Geneva Human Rights Council that she would send her office staff to China in advance to prepare for her visit next month. China's ambassador to the UN General Assembly said he was welcome.
The focus of observers is mainly on why China agreed to Michelle Bachelet's visit to China.
Adrian Zenz, a researcher who has played a key role in exposing China's genocide against the Uyghurs to the world, said in an interview with our radio station: It is now 2022 and they have been given enough time. It all started in 2017. The survey was delayed in 2020 under the pretext of the coronavirus. An agreement has been reached between the United Nations and China, but we do not know what the agreement will be. It is clear that Michel Bachelet's visit will not be a genuine investigation. The Chinese government is using the visit as an opportunity to justify its crimes. This is even more dangerous. I think Michelle Bachelet was better off going. Because he is a high-ranking official, China is taking advantage of this. Originally, Michelle Bachelet had to stay in China for at least half a year instead of giving up and send an unlimited number of inspections to China to investigate the contents of the report. He is a busy high-ranking official who will only be visiting for a few days. "It simply came to our notice then.
According to a March 8 Reuters report, Michelle Bachelet, along with nearly 200 civil society organizations around the world, wrote an open letter. In a letter to Bachelet's report on the situation of the Uyghurs, they called on the victims to ensure that no country, no matter how powerful, is superior to independent law or international scrutiny by the UN Human Rights Council.
Michelle Bachelet reportedly said the report on Uyghurs would be released in December 2021, but has not yet been released.
US Secretary of State Billinken also addressed the Human Rights Council last week, accusing China of committing genocide against the Uyghurs and calling for the release of a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Mr Adrian Zenz said: But reports from People say that's just what's happening. "It simply came to our notice then.
Sophie Richardson said in a statement: It seems that he (Michelle Bachelet) chose to stand by the oppressor, not the oppressed. If he is honest in this investigation, he must first disclose his report. He wants to launch another product without having to worry about the Commission instituting various actions under antitrust law. ” "It simply came to our notice then.
Michelle Bachelet's response to China's permission was not strong. Human rights groups are worried that the United Nations will be subject to the Chinese government's crackdown on ethnic oppression and assimilation in China.
Our radio tried to contact the office of Michel Bachelet, President of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, by phone and email, but they did not respond.