Prior to the recent escalation in southern Lebanon, an opinion poll conducted in Israel by the Israel Democracy Institute revealed a general mood of crisis, where security concerns intertwine with internal political tensions and a decline in confidence in the Israeli leadership's ability to manage the various fronts of war, particularly against Iran and Hezbollah. The poll was conducted between May 31 and June 5, 2016, prior to the latest round of fighting between Israel and Iran on June 7–8. According to the Palestinian Institute for Israeli Studies (Madar), the most striking finding of the poll is that 57.5 percent of Israelis believe that ending the war with Iran under the current circumstances contradicts Israel's security interests or serves them only to a limited extent. This result reveals the continued presence of a hardline security perspective in public opinion, even amidst the accumulated fatigue from the war and the multiplicity of fronts. Conversely, only a minority believes that ending the war at this stage serves Israeli security interests.
The poll revealed a decline in optimism across the four areas the institute examines monthly: the future of democratic governance, national security, the economy, and social cohesion. The decline was most pronounced in national security and democratic governance, at approximately 4 percent, and less so in the economy and social cohesion, at approximately 1.5 percent. On the other hand, 40 percent of respondents expressed optimism about the future of democratic governance, compared to only 35 percent regarding the future of national security. This discrepancy is striking, as optimism about national security has often been higher than optimism about democracy in previous surveys. The results indicate that security, traditionally an area of relative confidence among the Jewish public, has become a growing concern. Furthermore, social cohesion remains the most fragile area in the poll, with only 21 percent of respondents expressing optimism about it.
The poll also revisited Israelis' attitudes toward US President Donald Trump, specifically the question of whether Israel's security is a central consideration for him. The important finding here is that only 41 percent of Jews believe this, compared to 64 percent in March 2026, during the last war (“Lion’s Roar”).
The poll asked participants whether they believed a potential agreement between the United States and Iran to end the war would include provisions achieving three goals: preventing the continued development of Iranian nuclear weapons, eliminating the ballistic missile threat, and weakening the Iranian regime. The results show that Israelis place greater hope in the provision preventing the continuation of nuclear weapons development, with 56 percent of respondents believing the agreement would include this objective. However, optimism is significantly lower regarding the other two goals: only 32 percent believe the agreement will eliminate the ballistic missile threat, and only 28 percent believe it will weaken the Iranian regime. These figures reveal that the Israeli public does not view a potential agreement as a comprehensive tool for addressing the Iranian threat; it offers a relative advantage on the nuclear issue, but lacks confidence in its ability to address the missile capabilities or weaken the regime in Tehran. Therefore, the reluctance to end the war under the current circumstances becomes understandable within the logic of Israeli public opinion: ending the war without addressing the missiles and the regime does not seem sufficient to a large majority. A comparison with March 2026 reveals a significant decline in optimism. During the recent war, "Operation Lion's Roar," roughly two-thirds of Israelis believed that military action could eliminate the Iranian nuclear program and the ballistic missile threat, and more than half of the public thought it could lead to the regime's downfall. In May, after the debate shifted to the possibility of a US-Iranian agreement, expectations dropped significantly, indicating that Israelis were more confident in the military option than the diplomatic one at that time.
Regarding Israel's war against Hezbollah, the poll results reveal widespread dissatisfaction: only 17.5 percent of Israelis give Israel a good or excellent rating for its handling of Hezbollah. This result reflects a gap between the government's rhetoric about "restoring deterrence" in the north and the public's assessment of the reality; the majority do not believe that Israel's performance against Hezbollah deserves a high rating.
On the question of limiting the prime minister's term to two terms, 61 percent of all Israelis supported such a law, provided it applied only to those beginning their their term after its enactment—meaning it would not apply to Benjamin Netanyahu—while about a quarter of the public opposed the law. According to Madar, the significance of this finding lies in the fact that it indicates relatively broad acceptance of the idea of term limits, even without directly turning it into a tool against Netanyahu. Sixty-one percent of Israelis believe Netanyahu should not run in the next Knesset elections, compared to 35 percent who believe he should.
Political blocs: Weak preparedness
When asked which bloc is better prepared for the elections, 21.7 percent of the public believe the coalition bloc is better prepared, compared to 16.2 percent who believe the opposition bloc is better prepared, and 19.5 percent who believe both blocs are equally prepared. However, the largest percentage, 25.8 percent, believes neither bloc is prepared. These results point to a general crisis of confidence in the party system; the public does not see a sufficiently prepared opposition, nor a coalition capable of entering the elections from a comfortable position. Even on the right, where the coalition is supposed to be more established, about a third believe the coalition is better prepared, while more than a quarter believe neither bloc is prepared. Regarding the chances of forming the next government, 31 percent of Israelis believe the current coalition bloc has a better chance, compared to 27.4 percent who believe the opposition has a better chance, 18.9 percent who believe the chances are equal, and 22.7 percent who do not know.
The survey asks participants whether they would consider leaving Israel if the political bloc they do not support wins and forms the next government; about 17 percent of all Israelis said they were sure or thought they would consider it.
Summaries
Amidst ongoing wars and escalating internal crises, a May 2026 poll by the Israel Democracy Institute paints a picture of an Israeli society that is anxious, divided, and skeptical of the current leadership's direction. On the Iranian issue, a clear majority rejects ending the war under the existing circumstances, believing that no potential agreement will address all aspects of the "threat." Regarding relations with the United States, Trump's image is faltering among the Jewish public, and confidence in his prioritization of Israel's security is waning. In the north, the public does not give Israel a high rating in its confrontation with Hezbollah. Domestically, a majority supports limiting the prime minister's term, and an even larger majority believes Netanyahu should not run in the next election.
Politically, no camp decisively benefits from this mood: the coalition, according to pollsters, has a better chance of forming a government than the opposition among a segment of the Jewish public, but it lacks widespread support.
On the other hand, the opposition enjoys better prospects among Arabs, the left, and the center, but it fails to convince large segments of the population that it is ready. Therefore, the poll reveals a dual crisis: declining trust in the government on the one hand, and weak confidence in the alternative on the other. Thus, it can be said that all these indicators revolve around one conclusion: the war no longer merely reinforces the "security" narrative, but has also exposed the limits of trust in the political and military leadership, in the relationship with the United States, and in the Israeli political system's ability to produce internal stability.
