The Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University believes that the strategic siege surrounding Saudi Arabia now, following the Houthis’ control of Bab al-Mandab, represents a political and security opportunity for Israel.
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In a new working paper, the Institute argues that when Riyadh discovers the limitations of American support and sees the gap between the statements of its new partners and their actual willingness to use force, Israel can prove its value as a security partner by providing indirect assistance.
Regarding the nature of the assistance, he adds: “This aid does not necessarily have to be conditional, as the Kingdom is likely to remember this favor, just as previous Israeli aid to the Gulf states later had political value.” The institute emphasizes that the immediate objective is to prevent Iran and its proxies from gaining strategic influence at the region’s two maritime gateways, while the long-term goal is to make this convergence of interests the foundation for a deeper Israeli-Saudi partnership in the future.
Israel has a direct interest in containing the Houthis and preventing them from establishing a foothold in Bab al-Mandab, and it should communicate with Saudi Arabia and provide it with covert assistance.
The institute says that while global attention has focused on the Strait of Hormuz in recent months, the battle for the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is escalating rapidly. It also states that the escalating war in Yemen and the growing Houthi threat to navigation in the Red Sea are no longer separate arenas, but rather another front in the regional conflict with Iran.
Regarding the implications for Saudi Arabia, the Israeli institute adds: “Saudi Arabia is experiencing a real crisis and unprecedented strategic pressure. The Strait of Hormuz is blocked from the east, the oil pipeline between east and west is damaged, the Houthis are launching attacks on its territory, and the alternative route through the Red Sea is threatened. Consequently, its ability to defend its territory and secure its oil exports is under pressure from several directions simultaneously.”
According to the institute, this crisis represents a test for the new alliances built by Riyadh (the Mecca Alliance) as well as for the United States. For the Trump administration, which seeks to reduce its presence in the region, the challenge lies in assisting a key ally and ensuring freedom of navigation without being drawn into another front against the Houthis and expanding the war with Iran.
He argues that Israel has a direct interest in containing the Houthis and preventing them from establishing a foothold in Bab al-Mandab, and that it should engage with Saudi Arabia and offer it covert assistance without preconditions or attempts to extract immediate political concessions. The institute states that containing the Houthis and keeping Bab al-Mandab open has become a shared interest of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
regional war
According to the Institute for National Security Studies, recent developments in Yemen show that the war with Iran is gradually transforming from a limited war into a multi-sectoral regional war in Yemen and Iraq, and that the maritime arena is no longer separate: Iran is disrupting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis are putting pressure on Saudi Arabia and consolidating their control over the Bab al-Mandab region, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are joining the campaign.
Thus, the Iranian axis functions as a decentralized network capable of exerting cumulative pressure from multiple directions, even without direct Iranian leadership and control over each of its components. The institute argues that, simultaneously, control of narrow sea lanes has become a strategic tool in its own right, and that Iran does not need to completely close the Strait of Hormuz, nor do the Houthis need to completely close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It justifies this assessment by stating that the ability to disrupt shipping for an extended period, drive up insurance and transportation costs, and render export routes unreliable is sufficient to generate influence far exceeding their military strength.
The viability of alliances
From this the institute concludes: “The dangerous scenario lies in the formation of a maritime pincer movement around the Arabian Peninsula, where Iran and its proxies could simultaneously disrupt the region’s two main shipping lanes.”
According to the institute, the crisis also reveals the shortcomings of the region's new alliances. Saudi Arabia has broadened its security support in recent years—from the United States to the maritime coalition in the Red Sea, and the Mecca alliance with Turkey and Pakistan—but currently, none of these offer a complete answer to the challenge it faces.
He adds in this context: “Turkey and Pakistan are currently refraining from direct military intervention, the United States is hesitant to expand its campaign, and the anti-Houthi camp in Yemen is suffering from fragmentation and weakness. This is another expression of a broader principle. Multiple alliances give countries options, flexibility, and more room to maneuver, but they do not guarantee greater security.”
The Israeli Institute argues that Saudi Arabia is effectively under strategic siege, explaining that the Strait of Hormuz is closed from the east, a pipeline running east to west and designed to bypass the strait has been damaged, and in the south, the Houthis control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, threatening the alternative route through the Red Sea. It notes that even the alternative routes the Kingdom built to mitigate its vulnerability have themselves become targets.Regarding the gap between what is available and what is missing, the institute continues: “The Kingdom does not suffer from a shortage of oil, but rather from an inability to transport it safely to markets. Stockpiles can provide temporary relief, and damaged infrastructure can be repaired, but repairing the pipeline does not end the crisis: what is repaired today may be damaged again tomorrow. Therefore, the challenge is not limited to resuming exports, but extends to securing export arteries that can be protected in the long term.”
strategic siege
According to this Israeli perspective, the strategic blockade also takes on a dimension of being a direct threat to the Saudi home front. In recent days, authorities have been forced to issue repeated warnings to residents of southern cities about Houthi missiles and drones, after previous attacks caused dozens of casualties and damaged energy infrastructure.
The Israeli institute concludes from this that Saudi Arabia must protect its export routes, rehabilitate its damaged infrastructure, and protect its cities from any further attacks.
Regarding the Israeli perspective, the institute adds: “From an Israeli standpoint, the main significance lies in the fact that the Houthi threat is no longer solely a Yemeni matter, nor is it limited to threatening navigation in the Red Sea. Rather, it is part of a larger confrontation with Iran, and an attempt to exert pressure on regional states by controlling their vital supply lines. This, in its view, creates a clear and strong common interest between Israel and Saudi Arabia: preventing the Houthis from consolidating their power, which could allow Iran and its allies to threaten both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait simultaneously.”
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