In January 2024, after the presidential election, Taiwanese influencer "Ailishasha" and others posted on social media accusing the Central Election Commission of using unfair tactics to inflate votes for a specific candidate. The CEC subsequently filed a lawsuit against "Ailishasha" and 21 others for aggravated defamation. In October of the same year, the Taipei District Prosecutors' Office decided not to prosecute, finding insufficient evidence.
False information alleging "election fraud" is common in democratic countries. After the election, Chen Huimin, co-founder of the Taiwan Digital Literacy Lab , analyzed the situation for the Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL). He found that a major category of election fact-checking topics is "election flaws," meaning that election officials make corrections after public testimony, "but the video stops there." The subsequent corrections or adjustments made by election officials are not included in the video or photos, allowing these election errors to become fodder for misinformation and even be exaggerated as vote manipulation. In reality, however, these errors are often corrected immediately.
This is a controversy that occurred within Taiwan and emerged after the election, but the "vote-rigging conspiracy theory" actually began to brew and spread before the vote, and the main dissemination platform was TikTok.
One example of "coordinated manipulation" uncovered by the Taiwan Democracy Lab involved two influencers independently posting short videos on TikTok before the election, alluding to vote fraud in the upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Two key points are worth noting:
First, the past posts of these two internet celebrities mainly focused on "beauty" and "fashion", which had nothing to do with politics.
Second, comparing the two influencers' videos reveals strikingly similar filming styles, angles, and camera positions, with even the dialogue being nearly identical. A Democracy Lab researcher explained in an interview that the large number of videos featuring identical lines suggests a coordinated effort, with a specific organization behind the scenes providing the unified content.
this series , AFCL analyzed how the Fujian Network media group transported and broadcast political propaganda targeting Taiwan on the internet and mobile platforms. Combined with the widespread "vote-rigging" videos circulated before the 2024 election, it can be seen that TikTok, used by one in three Taiwanese, is the final and perhaps most important distribution center for these false information and political propaganda.
What's so appealing about TikTok? Can it truly be separated from its sibling, Douyin? Are many seemingly ordinary TikTok accounts broadcasting anti-Taiwan propaganda actually controlled by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) state media? And what are the long-term consequences for Taiwan if TikTok's expansion is allowed?
Can TikTok and Douyin really be separated?
Douyin is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, which is also TikTok's major shareholder. ByteDance was founded by Chinese entrepreneur Zhang Yiming, who initially held substantial control. However, in 2021, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Chinese government's regulator for online communications and news, and other agencies established the China Internet Investment Fund Management Co., Ltd. (CIOF), which acquired a 1% stake in ByteDance. ByteDance has three directors, but this company, with only a 1% stake, has the power to appoint one director.
According to a search on the Chinese corporate platform "Qichacha," China Internet Investment is the second-largest shareholder of Beijing ByteDance Technology Co., Ltd., holding a 1% stake. According to China Internet Investment's official introduction, the company was established in accordance with the decisions and deployments of the CPC Central Committee, approved by the State Council, and jointly initiated by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the Ministry of Finance. Its purpose is to promote major measures in the "Internet Power Strategy."
As for who owns TikTok, often called the "international version of Douyin," He Ping (a pseudonym), who previously worked at ByteDance, pointed out in an interview that while TikTok is nominally controlled by Singaporean Chow Shou-chi, real power remains in the hands of China's ByteDance. "This massive machine (TikTok) belongs to Zhang Yiming, but if you look further ahead, I think the Communist Party is also the owner. Even though the CCP only holds a 1% stake, it has veto power."
In June 2023, former ByteDance executive Yintao Yu pointed out in documents submitted to a US court that the Chinese Communist Party has established a committee within ByteDance that can obtain "super user" certification and review all data collected within ByteDance. He also accused some Chinese officials of even being able to collect data from American users on TikTok.
Moreover, under China's political system, it's often considered natural for large companies to cooperate with government operations, especially in matters of national security. For example, the National Intelligence Law stipulates that any company or individual has an obligation to cooperate with national intelligence work. "Many of TikTok's resources and teams are also in Beijing, so TikTok's executive team is actually still Douyin. So how could I not give it to China when it wants to access data?" He Ping told AFCL that all of ByteDance's data, including TikTok's information, can be freely transferred by the Chinese government if it wants. "In China, your talk of a firewall is fake."
Why is TikTok attractive?
Why is TikTok so popular around the world?
He Ping suggests that this can be observed from Zhang Yiming's previous product, Toutiao. Toutiao's algorithm, based on a "data mining recommendation engine," recommended articles to users. In its early days, to attract traffic, it flooded the platform with uncensored, low-quality content, including fake news, pornography, and violence. The platform was even summoned by the Cyberspace Administration of China and ordered to rectify its actions. ByteDance later copied a similar algorithm when it created Douyin and TikTok, leading to the push of "chaotic content."
He Ping believes that Douyin and TikTok weren't created to produce high-quality content, but rather to push videos that users would enjoy and become addicted to. This strategy has proven successful, as most users don't care about the quality of the videos on the platform, focusing solely on topics that interest them. "They don't really care about fake news, as it doesn't impact the platform itself and still brings in traffic, so they just leave it alone. After all, it wasn't me who posted it, it was someone else who posted it."
"When we were at ByteDance, we actually had nearly 700 million active users every day. If you continue to polish those 700 million people, your algorithms will definitely become more and more accurate," said He Ping.
Two analysts from the Taiwan Democracy Lab explained to AFCL the "basic principles" of TikTok and Douyin's operations: Initially, a "basic package" is created based on users from different regions, ages, and genders. For example, after creating an account, men will receive more video content such as game live streams and memes, while female users are more likely to scroll to videos of cute animals, skits, dances, and the like.
Analysts at the Democracy Lab said that compared to traffic algorithms such as hashtags and keywords on traditional social media, short video platforms such as TikTok care more about the time individual users stay on a single topic and the interaction rate, thereby strengthening the subsequent promotion of content.
However, Democracy Lab testing found that political information gradually seeps in during this process. By the third day and a week later, TikTok and Douyin gradually began to push political content. The algorithm then calculated how much users engaged with these videos, determining whether to continue to follow up. "TikTok accurately identifies their preferences, so users don't need to search specifically for what they like."
The next key point is that once user stickiness is established, political propaganda content without a clear stance will begin to be pushed. This content usually conveys that Chinese society is not as terrible as rumored. The underlying strategy is to lay the groundwork for relevant content to make the Taiwanese people believe that even after the unification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the lives of Taiwanese people will not change much.
What topics or even actions might TikTok launch?
Whether it is the rumors of "TSMC moving to the US" or "vote rigging", what role does the TikTok platform play?
He Ping revealed that most of the CCP’s political propaganda on Douyin was directly ordered by the Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China, and ByteDance has a specific window for receiving orders.
However, He Ping also pointed out that as a commercial platform, Douyin prioritizes traffic, and compared to movies, entertainment, and lifestyle content, the traffic generated by political content is negligible. Therefore, He Ping believes that, aside from specific content like Xi Jinping's important speeches being pinned to the top of the page, Douyin does not actively promote political content. A more common practice is to manipulate traffic through external organizations, such as agencies hiring a large number of influencers to simultaneously promote a single message.
He Ping speculates that the pro-Taiwan propaganda on TikTok is likely being initiated by the government, or perhaps commissioned by the government through a private company. "My understanding is that the United Front Work Department, the Central Propaganda Department, or the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council will undoubtedly spend a lot of money to fuel this propaganda. However, I remain skeptical about whether Douyin and TikTok themselves will strengthen their traffic algorithms. Later, I discovered that it's likely driven by the creators."
As for the specific method, "it's just about paying. If the United Front Work Department is setting the price, they will definitely look at who has traffic in Taiwan, then say we have an order and look for people who might take it. They will analyze the background data of each influencer individually, and even if the main audience is in Taiwan, they will definitely be able to obtain the relevant data."
The Democracy Lab's assessment is not far off He Ping's. The researcher cited another example: the November 2024 issue of 100,000 Indian migrant workers arriving in Taiwan also showed signs of CCP manipulation. At the time, influencers who had previously discussed economic or investment issues suddenly used identical lines to discuss Indian migrant worker policies, clearly using the same script.
A researcher at the Democracy Lab said, "He probably doesn't normally receive instructions like this. He usually only gives you instructions when an event arises, like the Indian migrant worker issue, and then asks you to make a video."
"And his profit model is that I might offer you different prices depending on the number of views, and he might get this profit from the PR company that issued the order."
As for the "campaign," TikTok launched a " show of force " in the United States in March 2024. At the time, the US House of Representatives was reviewing a bill requiring the Chinese company ByteDance to sell TikTok within 165 days or face a ban. To counter this, TikTok launched an app-based campaign, urging users to "Speak Up Now." A dialog box popped up within the app, allowing users to enter their ZIP code to obtain the phone number of the congressional representative in that district. TikTok encouraged users to call and let their representatives "understand what TikTok means to them and ask them to vote against it."
This initiative paralyzed the phones of numerous lawmakers' offices, prompting Republican Mike Gallagher, chairman of the Select Committee on Chinese Communist Party Affairs, to criticize TikTok for launching a "massive political propaganda campaign." Could a similar operation be repeated in Taiwan? He Ping stated that this would be similar to typical commercial promotions on Douyin and TikTok platforms, and that the technical aspects of the operation would not be a problem.
Should TikTok be subject to additional regulation? And how?
Taiwan banned the use of TikTok on government devices in December 2022. After that, there were discussions about a complete ban on TikTok, but in the end it was shelved due to controversy over "freedom of speech."
Analysts at the Democracy Lab believe that a direct ban on social media would be difficult to gain the support of the majority of Taiwanese people. The reason for this, in addition to the debate involving freedom of speech, is that people with different positions have very different perspectives on TikTok.
"I think those who are advocating for a TikTok ban are actually not on the same page as TikTok users on this matter. Those who oppose TikTok's operations in Taiwan believe that the platform contains a lot of political or negative content, but the vast majority of users believe that it is just an entertainment platform."
Analysts believe that one approach is to implement local regulation, similar to Facebook's approach in Taiwan. If a company is established, it would be subject to Taiwanese regulations. Currently, while the TikTok app is available in Taiwan, it does not have an office.
Furthermore, elevating the TikTok issue from a political perspective to a social and cultural dimension is also a good approach. Analysts at the Democracy Lab noted that TikTok frequently sees "borderline videos"—those suspected of being inappropriate for children, depicting sexual violence, or potentially advocating illegal behavior—circulating on the platform. Using these examples to rally civic groups focused on diverse issues and explain the severity of TikTok's lack of regulation to the Taiwanese public would be more effective than focusing solely on "national security" issues.
Both Democracy Lab analysts and He Ping believe that despite the possibility of TikTok secretly limiting its traffic, voices opposing the widespread propaganda campaign should not ignore the platform. Rather than passively adopting defensive measures like fact-checking and legislative bans, pro-Taiwan and anti-communist organizations should proactively promote their ideas on the platform.
"My assumption is that there are not enough accounts (resisting foreign propaganda) compared to pro-China accounts. So if your number is insufficient and you are censored, then of course it will be difficult to see pro-Taiwan rhetoric on the platform," said He Ping.
Taking a cue from other countries, the EU's Digital Services Directive requires large platforms to disclose the core parameters of their recommendation systems and provide a non-personalized browsing option, meaning algorithms cannot push content based on user preferences. The Leiden Asia Centre in the Netherlands also recommends adding a non-personalized traffic option to recommendation systems to prevent the formation of information silos.
What are the long-term impacts of TikTok’s unification of Taiwan?
How will TikTok's proliferation of pro-China videos affect Taiwan? The Taiwan Internet Information Research Center released the "2024 Taiwan Internet Report ," revealing gender, age, and other data on TikTok and Douyin usage in Taiwan. It found that the 18-29 age group had the highest usage rate, at 34.37%. The second highest usage rate was found among those aged 30-39, at 27.77%. Together, these two groups account for more than half of the population. TikTok (and Douyin) ranked third in usage, behind only Facebook and Instagram.
TikTok is used by a large number of young people. He Ping believes that the strength of TikTok lies in its ability to subtly influence users to "not reject China." "As long as you don't reject me, then I've actually won, right? I'm not asking you to immediately identify with the People's Republic of China or One China, but as long as you find our stuff interesting, then I'm halfway there."
He Ping stated that Douyin and TikTok have already gained considerable influence. For example, nearly all the popular songs in Taiwanese KTVs come from Douyin, and young people are being subtly influenced without even realizing it. "The paradox is that those who grew up watching TikTok, including many in central and southern Taiwan, and whose families may even support Taiwanese independence, actually find their songs, dramas, and even their current vocabulary very 'mainland'."
In January of this year, the Cyberspace Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) at Rutgers University in the United States released a report titled "Information Manipulation on TikTok and How It Influences American Users' Perceptions of China." The study found that on TikTok, anti-CCP content received four times as many likes and comments as pro-CCP content, while pro-CCP videos outnumbered anti-CCP content by three times. An NCRI report from August 2024 confirmed that the proportion of anti-China videos on TikTok was significantly lower than on other video platforms like YouTube and Instagram.
A report released by the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center in January 2025 pointed out that people who use TikTok in Taiwan have a more favorable impression of China, believe that pro-American policies are more likely to cause war, and are more prone to Taiwan's economic failure.
"If the message I push makes you distrust democracy and your ruling party, then you are more likely to accept China's system because you hate your ruling party and you may feel that its (the Communist Party's) management style may have a better chance," said a researcher at the Democracy Lab.
"They're particularly focused on making young people and some members of the public view Taiwan's future as extremely negative. If it's already so bad, unification wouldn't make it any worse."
The researcher emphasized that young people are an important target for China's united front work using short videos. China takes advantage of the fact that young people are generally less politically sensitive and makes good use of Taiwan's domestic issues to operate, just like reposting the remarks of famous Taiwanese commentators and using Taiwanese people to oppose the Taiwanese regime. This is more persuasive and highlights that democratic politics has actually failed in Taiwan. Democracy no longer brings advantages to Taiwan, and thus makes the Taiwanese audience believe that unification "actually does not make much difference."
"In fact, we interviewed some young people, and they did clearly mention that during the 2024 election, there will be a lot of content that even they know is political. These are nothing more than editing and reproducing some conflicts in the Taiwan Legislative Yuan, and then using out-of-context or sensational words to belittle specific political parties."
"Some also promote the idea that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, or use scenes from wars in the Middle East or the Russo-Ukrainian war to reinforce the idea that this could happen if the wrong person is chosen."
Researchers at the Democracy Lab emphasized that most Taiwanese youth agree that the Chinese government is authoritarian and hostile toward Taiwan, but when asked about the Chinese people and Chinese society, they would separate Chinese society and the government, believing that the Chinese people or Chinese society as a whole are just ordinary people in Taiwan, and that their lives are not much different.
"As for the issue of unification, the vast majority of respondents actually believe that maintaining the status quo is the best option.
But when asked if war were to break out, they would choose not to resist. Multiple studies and interviews have revealed that China has clearly used TikTok and Douyin as a crucial tool for united front work against Taiwan. This doesn't require immediate or direct changes to a person's national identity; simply weakening Taiwanese people's sensitivity to the Chinese threat and their will to resist can achieve victory without fighting.
Comparing Taiwanese people's attitudes towards using TikTok, is Taiwan ready? (End)
The first ten reports in the series "CCP Propaganda in Taiwan" are as follows:
Part 2: The large-scale external propaganda structure behind Lin Jingdong and Lin Xianyuan
Part 3: How were old local newspapers instilled with pro-China narratives?
Part 4: The two "Daobao" newspapers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
5. Fujian Network, the Operator of United Front Work Against Taiwan
6. Should we regulate the Internet? That is a question.
No. 7: Fujian’s online program on united front against Taiwan, Made in Taiwan?
Part 8: The Mainstream Media's Pro-China Path and the "Great Liberation" of the Internet
9. Content Farm Transformation into Video Influencer
Part 10: Fujian Network’s Air Combat Trilogy
